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An Event-Time Analysis of the Three Mile Island Nuclear Accident
ABSTRACT
The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of the 28 March
1979 accident at the Three Mile Island (TMI) nuclear power facility on
the systematic risk of General Public Utilities (TMI's owner) and other
electric utilities heavily invested in nuclear power facilities. The
results have implications for the returns required by investors and,
therefore, on the economic viability of nuclear power for electricity
generation. This paper compares the results of a traditional cumulative
abnormal residual analysis (CAR) with the results of intervention analysis,
It is found that the CAR analysis indicates abnormal negative returns
occurred after the TMI accident. However, intervention analysis shows
the assumptions necessary for the CAR method to be appropriate are
violated. When adjustments are made for a shift in systematic risk and
autocorrelation, no abnormal returns are generated.

An Event-Time Analysis of the Three-Mile Island Nuclear Accident
The March 28, 1979 Three Mile Island (TMI) nuclear accident added
a new dimension to the ongoing debate over the private and social costs
and benefits of nuclear power. Utility executives speculate "that the
Harrisburg accident will add billions of dollars to nuclear generating
costs that are already vastly higher than imagined" [18]. Some indica-
tion of TMI's "financial fallout" became apparent when General Public
Utilities (GPU), which owns the TMI nuclear reactor, cut its quarterly
dividend and told its stockholders on May 9, 1979 that unless govern-
mental subsidies for the accident costs were forthcoming, GPU faced
bankruptcy [1]. Not surprisingly, investment articles on the electric
utility industry immediately began presenting utility data classified by
the capacity percentage represented by nuclear power. Now, some four
years after the accident the cleanup costs are estimated at $975 million
and the expected completion date is mid-1988 [20].
The TMI accident made the cost-profit-risk dimensions of "nuclear
risk" more apparent to investors and regulators. Whether the TMI inci-
dent altered the required rate of return of equity investors in electric
utilities with nuclear generating capacity (hereafter nukes) is an impor-
tant question. In an efficient capital market, a firm specific event
such as the TMI accident would be hypothesized to have a negligible impact
on nuke and non-nuke utility stocks. However, if nuclear generating
capacity is perceived as increasing an investor's risk, then this x^ill
impact regulatory allowed rates of return and the cost-benefit choice
between competing power generation sources.
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The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of the accident
on the risk and return characteristics of (1) General Public Utilities,
(2) other electric utilities heavily invested in nuclear power facil-
ities, and (3) electric utilities without investment in nuclear power.
Three empirical methodologies are used in the study: (1) cumulative
abnormal returns (CAR) analysis, (2) intervention analysis and (3) beta
decomposition analysis. Section I describes the models to be used and
presents the empirical results of each model. Concluding remarks are
presented in Section II.
I. The Models
Three empirical methodologies are used to examine the impact of
the TMI accident on the returns and risks of the nuke and the non-nuke
utility stocks. Risk and return are examined for (1) a portfolio of
utilities which own and operate nuclear units, (2) a portfolio of util-
ities which have no investment in nuclear units, (3) General Public
Utilities, the owner of the TMI nuclear unit, and (4) the five utili-
ties with the largest investment in nuclear facilities. All three
methodologies utilize 121 weeks of return data; 60 weeks before and
2
after the week of the accident.
A. Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) Analysis
The traditional CAR method has been widely used in event-time studies
to measure the impact of the announcement of new publicly available in-
formation (such as earnings, dividends, stock splits, mergers, accounting
-3-
changes, etc.) on the risk-adjusted return of securities and to infer
3
market efficiency or information content. The method is based on the
single-factor market model given by
R. = a. + 3. R + e. (1)jt j Mj mt jt
where R. = the rate of return on security or portfolio j over period t,
R = the rate of return on a value-weighted market portfolio over
mt . ,period t,
z . = the random disturbance term of the rate of return on security
or portfolio j over period t, with E(e. ) = 0.
The residual term, e. , represents the deviation of the actual returnjt
in period t from the return estimated by the market model and hence is
a measure of risk-adjusted abnormal return.
In this study sixty weeks before and after the accident week are
designated as the estimation period and the analysis period, respectively.
The parameters estimated from equation (1) over the estimation period
are presented in Table I. The t-statistics for the beta estimates are
significant at the .01 level for all but one case, indicating that
systematic risk is indeed an important factor in the return generating
process for utility stocks.
[Insert Table I Here]
Given the market model parameter estimates, a. and 3., from the es-
j J
timation period, abnormal returns for each period t within the analysis
period are calculated as follows:
AR. = R. - (a. + 3. R ) (2)
Jt jt j j mt y
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For a portfolio, the cross-sectional average abnormal return for
period t is
N AP.
«t
=
\ TT (3)j-i
where N is the number of securities in the portfolio in period t. The
cumulative abnormal rettirn over the entire sample period is given by
60
CAR = Z AR . (4)
t=-60
The CARs are plotted in Figure 1. In all but one (GPU) case, the
CAR curves wander around zero and no persistent downward or upward drifts
occur either before or after the accident week. These results suggest
the firm specific TMI accident had negligible impact on other electric
utilities, both nuke and non-nuke. However, the CAR curve for the GPU
drifts downward persistently after the accident. The CAR reaches -121.6
percent fifty-two weeks after the accident and -86.8 percent at the end
of the analysis period.
[Insert Figure 1 Here]
With regard to GPU, the unfavorable reaction of the market to the
negative information content of the TMI accident causes the CAR curve
to drift persistently downward after the accident. An investor who sold
GPU stock short immediately after the accident could realize an 121.6
percent excess risk-adjusted return (before transaction costs) fifty-two
weeks after the accident. Substantial excess risk-adjusted returns are
generated even if transaction costs are considered.
However, these CAR results must be viewed with caution. CAR analysis
assumes the beta coefficient estimated for the 60-week pre-TMI period
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remains constant during the analysis period. But the persistent drift
in the CAR curve of GPU may be caused by changes in the systematic risk
of GPU as the result of the TMI accident. If so, the result obtained
from Figure lc will be biased and lead to incorrect conclusions. For
this reason, intervention analysis is employed to examine further the
impact of the TMI accident on the performance of nuke and non-nuke
utility stocks.
B. Intervention Analysis
Any financial announcement can be viewed as an intervention.
Recently, based on Box and Tiao [7], Larcker, Gordon and Pinches [22]
have proposed an alternative methodology, intervention analysis, for
event-time studies. Intervention analysis provides a better test for
market efficiency or information content than the CAR method on two counts,
First, it is able to test specifically for a shift in the return series
4
as distinct from systematic risk changes. More precisely, intervention
analysis can separate such risk changes from the information content of
the announcement. Second, it allows the observed autocorrelation in the
market model residuals to be removed.
The following expanded market model is utilized to examine the impact
of the TMI accident on the performance of nuke and non-nuke utility stocks
during the 60-week pre-TMI and 60-week post-TMI periods.
\' a + BAtl + S2V2 + YD + i5b (5)
. R : -60 < t <
where R = / mt
mt..
otherwise
R = J mt
mt
2
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<_ t ^ 60
otherwise
D
1 : <_ t <_ 60
: otherwise
B = the backshif t operator such that BR = R ,
<j> = the time series parameter of the noise model, and
a = the random disturbance term.
The coefficients, 3, and 3„, are measures of systematic risk before
and after the accident, respectively. The coefficient y measures the
post-accident excess risk-adjusted return. Table II summarizes the re-
sults of the parameter estimates for equation (5).
[Insert Table II Here]
As expected, the t-statistics for g and 3 9 indicate the beta coef-
ficients are significantly different from zero for most of the cases. This
means that systematic risk was an important explanation of returns for
most firms and portfolios both before and after the accident. More im-
portantly, the t-statistics for y are not significant for any case. Even
the y for GPU is insignificant which indicates no excess risk-adjusted
returns occurred following the TMI accident after allowing for shifts
in systematic risk and accounting for possible autocorrelation. Hence,
the results for GPU obtained using intervention analysis conflict with
the results obtained using the CAR method. CPU's post-accident 3 was
nearly double its pre-accident value. However, this change in beta was
not statistically significant due to the large standard errors of the esti-
mates. None of the betas for the other nukes or utility portfolios were
in
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statistically significantly different after the TMI accident. These
At At
results are presented as (8 - 6 ) in Table II.
C. Beta Decomposition Analysis
Some insights into the underlying characteristics of the observed
betas of the utilities around the TMI accident may also be obtained
through decomposition analysis. Francis [16] decomposed the beta coef-
ficient in an effort to determine whether the source of beta instabil-
ity arises from market return variability (a ) , asset return variability
m
(a.), or the correlation of asset and market returns (p. ).
Component values for the above three determinants of beta are shown
in Table III for the 60 week pre-TMI and the 60 week post-TMI periods for
the nuke and the non-nuke utility portfolios. The nuke and non-nuke port-
folios displayed similar p. , a
.
, and, thus, 3 values before TMI. The
non-nuke total risk proxy, a., increased significantly after TMI, but
the systematic association of non-nuke returns and market returns fell
sharply. Hence, slightly increased market variability and lower covar-
iance with the market caused the non-nuke beta to be slightly lower in
the post accident period. The beta for the nuke portfolio increased
slightly due to the doubling of a. even as the p. declined.
[Insert Table III Here]
Component values for GPU and the five utilities that obtain 43 to 58
percent of their capacity through nuclear generation facilities are also
presented in Table III. GPU's beta nearly doubled due to the fourfold
increase in a
. . GPU's p. declined by approximately 50%. Component
J j,m
data for the five utilities with the largest nuclear generation capacity
show the p. for these utilities declined and the o. increased. As
Table III
Component Values of 8s of Nukes and Non-Nukes in the
60 Week Pre-TMI and 60 Week Post-TMI Periods
°i ,m
a. 6.
3
Before After Before After Before After
TMI TMI TMI TMI TMI TMI
Nukes
(17)
0.6122 0.3510 0.0108 0.0210** 0.3458 0.3501
Non-Nukes
(28)
0.6963 0.3870 0.0101 0.0193** 0.3680 0.3530
GPU 0.4635 0.2297 0.0182 0.0787** 0.4426 0.8555
5 Nuke Group 0.5854 0.3215 0.0119 0.0226** 0.3663 0.3444
#1 0.3964 0.3223 0.0146 0.0283** 0.3041 0.4317
n 0.4133 0.1508 0.0199 0.0264 0.4331 0.1881
in 0.5289 0.3688 0.0125 0.0289** 0.3469 0.5040
#4 0.2904 0.2161 0.0178 0.0263
+
0.2700 0.2685
#5 0.4879 0.2475 0.0186 0.0282
+
0.4771 0.3299
Market
(NYSE & AMEX) 1.000 1.000 0.0190 0.0211 1.000 1.000
Total risk in Post-TMI period is significantly different from Pre-TMI period at
** 1% level (one-tailed test)
10% level (one-tailed test)
a result, txvo of these firms showed higher betas and three exhibited
lower betas.
To summarize, the correlation between electric utility returns and
the market declined for both nuke and non-nuke portfolios while the
standard deviation of returns increased for all utilities after the
accident. The change in beta depends on whether the increased return
variance was greater than, similar to, or less than the change in the
correlation.
To examine whether a shift in total risk (variance) was caused by
industry or firm specific effects or was due to changes in market-wide
factors, the total variation of portfolio and company returns was divided
into the proportion of variation explained by the market model and the
proportion accounted for by the residuals. The total risk measure was
decomposed into systematic and unsystematic components from equation (1)
2 ,2 2 2 ,„
a = B a + a (6)me
2 J . ,where a is the unsystematic risk.
The results for the pre-TMI and post-TMI periods are presented in Table
IV. It is observed that the proportion of the total variation explained
by the market model fell sharply after the accident for all portfolios
and individual utilities.
[Insert Table IV Here]
Thus, as the total variation of returns increased, the explanatory
power of the market model decreased. This is additional evidence that
the analysis of beta may be inadequate to describe the return series
following the TMI accident. Before the accident, both nuke and non-nuke
Table IV
Estimates of Risk Shifts Due to the TMI Accident
Portfolio Pre--TMI Post--TMI
or Company o 2 2/ 28 a /a
m
2/ 2
o-
e
/° a
2 2/8a/
m
2
a
2/ 2
a /a
e
Nuke .370 .630 .124 .876
Non-Nuke .479 .521 .149 .851
GPU .213 .787 .053 .947
5 Nukes .342 .658 .103 .897
#1 .157 .843 .104 .896
#2 .170 .830 .023 .977
#3 .278 .722 .135 .865
#4 .083 .917 .046 .954
#5 .238 .762 .061 .939
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stocks possess a significant degree of unsystematic risk due to the
regulatory environment in which the firms operate. After the acci-
dent the degree of unsystematic risk increased substantially. If
diversification cannot eliminate all unsystematic risk, the CAFM is no
longer an appropriate analytical tool to apply to both nuke and non-
7 8
nuke utilities in the sense that beta is an incomplete risk measure.
This incompleteness gives rise to obvious problems in determining the
appropriate fully-risk-adjusted rate of return for rate making purposes.
II. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
This paper has examined the impact the TMI accident had on the risk
and return characteristics of electric utilities with and without nuclear
generating capacity. Three methods of analysis were used to determine
if the risk and return characteristics of utilities changed due to the
TMI accident. The results of the CAR and intervention analysis method-
ologies were consistent for the non-nuke utilities and for all the
nuclear utilities except GPU. The CAR methodology indicated substantial
abnormal excess risk-adjusted (negative) returns occurred for GPU fol-
lowing the TMI accident. However, the intervention analysis, which
adjusts for systematic risk changes and autocorrelation, indicated there
were no excess risk-adjusted returns for GPU. The beta decomposition
analysis indicated the betas for the utilities were not significantly
changed because of relative changes in the correlation coefficient and
total return variability. For GPU the increase in total return vari-
ability was nearly twice the decline in the correlation coefficient,
but because of large standard errors of the estimates, the increase in
beta was not statistically significant. Finally, the proportion of total
-10-
return variation explained by the market model was substantially less
after the TMI accident.
The observed level of total risk for both nuke and non-nuke port-
folios was substantially higher in the post-TMI period while the total
risk for the market index increased only slightly. Post-TMI systematic
risk for both nuke and non-nuke utilities was not significantly different
from the level of the pre-TMI period. Unsystematic risk increased sub-
stantially after the accident. As such, the impact of the TMI accident
upon an electric utility's cost of equity capital revolves around whether
investors' required return is based only upon systematic risk.
-11-
FOOTNOTES
The electric utilities were classified using data contained in
[32, 33] into five nuclear generation categories as of April 1, 1978:
(1) operating nuclear units alone; (2) operating nuclear units jointly
with other utilities; (3) building nuclear units alone; (4) building
nuclear units jointly; and (5) no nuclear generation ownership. A
utility that both operated its own nuclear unit as well as operated
units jointly was classified in category 1. In this study "nukes" is
used to refer to category 1 firms and "non-nukes" to refer to category
5 firms. There are 17 utilities in the nuke group and 28 utilities in
the non-nuke group
.
The five utilities with the largest nuclear capacity percentages
are: (1) Baltimore Gas & Electric, 57%; (2) Carolina Power & Light,
47%; (3) Commonwealth Edison, 45%; (4) Northeast Utilities 58%; and
(5) Northern States Power, 43%.
2
Weekly rates of return are computed by compounding daily returns
for each calendar week. Daily returns were obtained from the CRSP tapes.
As Scholes and Williams [28] has shown, nonsynchronous trading of secu-
rities introduces into the market model a potentially serious econometric
problem of errors in variables. With daily data, the problem is espe-
cially severe. Hence, weekly data are used in the study.
3
See Ball and Brown [2], and Fama, Fisher, Jensen and Roll [15],
4
Changes in systematic risk have been documented by Boness, Chen and
Jutusipitak [4], Bar-Yosef and Brown [3], and Brenner and Smidt [9].
Evidence on the negatively correlated market model residuals can
be found in Ball and Brown [2], and Schwartz and Whitcomb [29].
(.
By examining the autocorrelations and partial autocorrelations of
equation (5), we find a first-order autoregressive model is appropriate
for the structural form of noise for most of the cases (see Box and
Jenkins [5], page 79).
Articles concerning the use of the capital asset pricing model
in rate regulatory hearings include [8, 11, 12, 19, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27,
31].
o
Brigham and Crum [11] reported electric utility security returns
are skewed to the left.
-12-
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